Epidemiology and Economics of Antibiotic Resistance

Eili Y. Klein

February 17, 2016


Health Watch USA Meeting



I. The burden of antibiotic resistance is a growing global threat, but hard numbers are lacking as to the magnitude of the problem



Burden of Antibiotic Resistance in the United States



Centers for Disease Control 2013



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Burden by Resistant Pathogen, US What is the best measure of burden?

Pathogen	Infections	Deaths
Streptococcus pneumoniae	1,200,000	7,000
Drug-resistant Campylobacter	310,000	28
Drug-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae	246,000	<5
Drug-resistant non-typhoidal Salmonella	100,000	40
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)	80,000	11,000
Drug-resistant Shigella	27,000	<5
Extended-spectrum β -lactamase producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBLs)	26,000	1,700
Vancomycin resistant Enterococcus (VRE)	20,000	1,300
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE)	9,300	610
Clindamycin-resistant Group B Streptococcus	7,600	440
Others	23,547	1,380
Total	2,049,447	23,508



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Burden of Antibacterial Resistance

European Union population 500m

25,000 deaths per year

2.5m extra hospital days

Overall societal costs (€ 900 million, hosp. days) Approx. €1.5 billion per year



Source: ECDC 2007

Thailand population 70m

>38,000 deaths

>3.2m hospital days

Overall societal costs US\$ 84.6–202.8 mill. direct >US\$1.3 billion indirect

Source: Pumart et al 2012

United States population 300m

>23,000 deaths

>2.0m illnesses

Overall societal costs Up to \$20 billion direct Up to \$35 billion indirect



Global Estimates Not Available



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European Union:

Extra in-hospital costs	Extra outpatient costs	losses due to absence	Productivity losses due to patients who died from their infection	TOTAL
€ 927.8 million	€ 10 million	€ 150.4 million	€ 445.9 million	€ 1.5 billion



European Union:

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For the US: If one assumes that there are 2,000,000 ARI per CDC, that \$20 billion is an excess cost of \$10,000 per infection. (Europe would be €750)



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For the US: If one assumes that there are 2,000,000 ARI per CDC, that \$20 billion is an excess cost of \$10,000 per infection. (Europe would be €750) US CDC estimate based on one hospital in which costs for ~1,000 patients with antibiotic resistant infections was estimated to be: Hospital: \$3.4–\$5.4 million Mortality: \$7.0-\$9.2 million Lost productivity: \$162,624-\$322,707 Total: \$10.7-\$15.0 million



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Excess costs of resistance by pathogen


Resistant Organism	Range of Excess Cost
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus	\$695 – \$29,030
Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus	\$16,711 – \$60,988
Pseudomonas aeruginosa	\$627 - \$45,256
Acinetobacter baumannii	\$5,336 - \$126,856
Multiple organisms	\$9372 – 18,990
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae	\$3,658 - \$4,892



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Unconsidered Costs


Costs of drugs for patients with non-resistant infections



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A Growing Problem

Antibiotic Resistance of *Escherichia coli* in United States






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resistancemap.cddep.org

A Growing Problem

Antibiotic Resistance of *Klebsiella pneumoniae* in United States





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A Global Problem Methicillin-Resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*




FIGURE 1-1¹: Percentage of *Staphylococcus aureus* isolates that are methicillin resistant (MRSA), by country (most recent year, 2011–14) Source: CDDEP 2015, WHO 2014 and PAHO, forthcoming



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Antimicrobial Resistance Worldwide More than just antibiotics at risk

Example of mycobacterium:

Tuberculosis

Increased morbidity and mortality, increased costs, threatened disease control Example of parasite:

Malaria

Threatened disease control Example of viruses:


HIV and influenza

Threatened disease control




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Worldwide Deaths Due to AMR





Economic Cost of AMR




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II. Increasing incomes are increasing access to antibiotics and saving lives but they are not a good substitute for public health



Changes in Global Consumption 2000-2010




Van Boeckel et al, Lancet Inf. Dis., 2014




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Antibiotic Consumption is Increasing in Developing Countries




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Antibiotic Consumption is Increasing in Developing Countries



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
Extended-spectrum macrolide use is highly prevalent in the United States, and increasing in developing countries






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Carbapenem use is increasing in the hospital



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
But carbapenems are also sold on the retail market





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Bacterial diseases are still major killers in developing countries because of lack of access to antibiotics






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What are We Asking of Antibiotics?

Crude infectious disease mortality rate in the United States, 1900–1996




Source: Adapted from Armstrong, Conn et al. (1999).

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
Source: Adapted from Armstrong, Conn et al. (1999).

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III. More antibiotic use is associated with increasing rates of antibiotic resistance



Antibiotic Use and Resistance







Figure 1: Total outpatient antibiotic use in 26 European countries in 2002

Antibiotic Use and Resistance



Source: Sun et al 2012



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IV. Drivers of antibiotic use relate to incentives and behavior of patients, physicians, pharma, payers and healthcare institutions.



Drivers of Antibiotic Use

How do incentives affect antibiotic prescribing?



Patient Expectations/Satisfaction

Patients more likely to get a prescription if they expect antibiotics

Physicians more likely to give a prescription if they believe patient expects antibiotics regardless of patient expectation



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Drivers of Patient Expectations

Germs are germs: e.g., bacteria and viruses are the same Why Not Take a Risk?: e.g., "I don't know if antibiotics will make me better, but it's better to be safe than sorry so I should take them"

Others:


Prior Knowledge: "I got better last time I got ABX"
WebMD: "Someone (i.e. internet/friend) told me that antibiotics will make me better"
Trust: "I trust the doctor to give me antibiotics if I am sick (when I need them)"
Seriousness: "If the doctor takes me seriously, they will give me a prescription"
Veni, Vidi, Vici: "Only a prescription is worth the wait"



Why Not Take a Risk?

Motivated by Fuzzy Trace Theory Status quo: patient is already sick Two options

- 1. Stay sick for sure (by avoiding antibiotics)
- 2. Maybe stay sick; maybe get better (by taking antibiotics)Getting better is preferred over staying sick, so choose antibioticsUnderlying assumptions:
 - There is some chance that antibiotics could make them feel better Antibiotics are essentially harmless to the individual





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Drivers of Antibiotic Use

How do incentives affect antibiotic prescribing?



Patient Expectations/Satisfaction Patient Socioeconomics Health insurance increases prescribing Free programs increase antibiotics



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Drivers of Antibiotic Use

How do incentives affect antibiotic prescribing?



Patient Expectations/Satisfaction Patient Socioeconomics Legal Ramifications Physician Remuneration



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Hospital Incentives




Antibiotics may be a substitute for infection control Infection control is often not compensated but longer hospital stays are beneficial to the hospital



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Pharmaceutical Incentives Patents



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Externalities of Antibiotics

and how they relate to incentives

Positive Externalities

Reduce the transmission of disease

Negative Externalities

The more antibiotics are used, the greater the selective pressure placed on bacteria to evolve

The problem is the absence of economic incentives for individuals/hospitals/companies to take into account the negative impact of their use of antibiotics on social welfare



V. There is no silver bullet for maintaining antibiotic effectiveness. There are tradeoffs to every approach.



So what can we do?

Maintaining antibiotic effectiveness in the long term requires

- 1. Conservation: Technological, medical, and incentive-based solutions to keep existing antibiotics working
- 2. Innovation: Develop new antibiotics

But these two approaches are linked in a negative feedback loop Increased innovation reduces the need for conservation and vice versa



Conservation

Antimicrobial stewardship

New clinically relevant tests that identify both the cause of an infection and its sensitivity to common antibiotics

Vaccines



C American Society for Mass Spectrometry, 2013

J. Am. Soc. Mass Spectrom. (2013) 24:1194–1201 DOI: 10.1007/s13361-013-0609-x

FOCUS: MS IN THE CHARACTERIZATION OF MICROORGANISMS: RESEARCH ARTICLE

Establishing Drug Resistance in Microorganisms by Mass Spectrometry

Plamen A. Demirev, Nathan S. Hagan, Miquel D. Antoine, Jeffrey S. Lin, Andrew B. Feldman

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 11100 Johns Hopkins Rd., Laurel, MD 20723, USA



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Other types of solutions?

Combination therapies that target both essential functions and resistance factors

Eg. amoxicillin-clavulanate

Repurpose old drugs to optimize dosing levels and the duration, and route of administration

E.g. optimized dosing of colistin to reduce toxicity and improve efficacy

Prevent resistance by protecting non-target bacterial flora during treatments



Antibiotics as a Natural Resource

The cost of discovering new sources of oil becomes more expensive as the resource is depleted (because harder to find and environmental regulations)

Increased incentives for finding new oil reserves reduces incentives to conserve oil





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Antibiotics as a Natural Resource

New antibiotics are likely to cost more than existing ones (because harder to discover and increased regulatory costs)


Subsidies for new drug development discourage efforts to improve how existing antibiotics are used





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Dwindling Antibiotic Development





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Once an antibiotic is introduced, resistance is not far behind

Introduction of new antibiotic classes 1959 natural product derived nitroimidazoles synthetic origin 1956 1949 1957 glycopeptides chloramphenicol ansamycins 1947 1952 1952 lincosamides macrolides nitrofuran 1944 1968 1952 2003 trimethoprim 🍷 aminoglycosides streptogramins lipopeptides 1935 1962 1941 1950 2000 sulfonamides **B**-lactams tetracyclines quinolones oxazolidinones 1930s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 7 1940s 1950s 1953 1961 1981 1940 macrolide methicillin Amp C Penicillinase resistance resistance β-lactamase 2000s 1942 1966 1983 resistance sulfonamide nalidixic acid ESBL against resistance resistance linezolid 1986 and VRE 1947 1968 daptomycin streptomycin tetracycline resistance 2002 resistance 1990s VRSA 1969 fluorochinolone aminoglycoside resistance modifying 1997 enzymes VISA

Development of bacterial resistance



Incentives to develop new antibiotics

Decrease cost of development (e.g. tax credits, grants, contracts, liability protection)

Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) – BARDA partnership

Increase income linked to antibiotics (e.g. extend exclusivity, patent extensions, prizes)


Under the Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act in the United States new antibiotics are given 5 years of additional market exclusivity for designated Qualified Infectious Disease Products



Do we need public subsidies for new antibiotic development or will the market respond on its own?




Do we need public subsidies for new antibiotic development or will the market respond on its own?





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Do we need public subsidies for new antibiotic development or will the market respond on its own?





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Do we need public subsidies for new antibiotic development or will the market respond on its own?

What is the impact of public subsidies for new drug development on stewardship? How can we change the rules of the game to incentivize appropriate use of new (and existing) antibiotics?

How do we balance access with concerns about resistance?



For research, updates and tools on drug resistance and other global health topics, visit:



Thank you!

